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Historicism and constructionism: rival ideas of historical change
Zoltán Boldizsár Simon
Institute for History, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
A seemingly unitary appeal to history might evoke today two incompatible
operations of historicization that yield contradictory results. This article
attempts to understand two co-existing senses of historicity as
conﬂicting ideas of historical change and rival practices of temporal
comparison: historicism and constructionism. At their respective births,
both claimed to make sense of the world and ourselves as changing
over time. Historicism, dominating nineteenth-century Western thought
and overseeing the professionalization of historical studies, advocated
an understanding of the present condition of the human world as
developing out of past conditions. Constructionism, dominating the
second half of the twentieth century, understood the present condition
as the recent invention of certain ‘historical’ environments, without prior
existence. As competing ideas of historical change, they both entail a
comparison between past and present conditions of their investigated
subjects, but their practices of temporal comparison are irreconcilable
and represent two distinct ways of historicization.
KEYWORDS
Historical change; historicism;
constructionism; temporal
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1. Becoming the norm
No one fears social constructionism today. And no one is even surprised these days that no one fears
constructionism. Insights which start out as rebellious (according to their self-description) simply
tend to become norms in the humanities and social sciences. Not necessarily unchallenged and
exclusive norms, but legitimate ones in a matrix of tenable academic practices. In the present climate,
however, constructionism is somewhere at the middle of a hypothetical intellectual spectrum on
which the two extremes are old-fashioned theories left untouched by constructionism and theories
growing out of more recent experiential horizons which already encountered constructionism as the
norm to be challenged.
As to constructionism becoming the norm, Ian Hacking’s The Social Construction of What?
(1999) demonstrates this best in its opening pages by providing an illustrious list of things already
claimed to be socially constructed. The ten ﬁrst entries of the list, in alphabetical order, are: author-
ship, brotherhood, the child viewer of television, danger, emotions, facts, gender, homosexual cul-
ture, illness, and knowledge.1 While two decades ago Hacking had to struggle with library
catalogs to collect individual entries to the list, Google Scholar ﬁnds today an impressive amount
of 11,400 titles (yes, only titles) including the phrase ‘social construction of’ in an instant. As to chal-
lenges to the norm, a variety of approaches either distance themselves from constructionism today in
one sense or another, explore its limits, or simply aim at investigating that which they consider as
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Zoltán Boldizsár Simon z.simon@hum.leidenuniv.nl
1Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1.
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS
https://doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2019.1653351
falling out of the constructionist scope. As examples of such tendency, one can think of an ecologi-
cally oriented critical posthumanism, speculative realism and object-oriented ontology, the strongly
related emergence of new materialism, or Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s eﬀorts to balance an unques-
tioned focus of humanities research on questions of meaning with exploring ‘presence’.2 Although
the plausibility of these and other endeavours is hotly debated, my intention by mentioning them
is neither to align with nor to refute them. They are summoned here only to testify a trend in current
scholarship that conceives of constructionism as a norm to be challenged.
Yet the fact that no one fears social constructionism does not mean that it is suﬃciently explored
and understood. Nor does its current reputation of being a domesticated view explain why construc-
tionism was feared in the second half of the last century. At the same time, however, it is precisely its
current reputation which calls for an investigation of the times when it was feared, in order to achieve
a better grasp of constructionist thought. On the following pages, I will attempt such an understand-
ing by exploring the relationship between constructionism and the question of history. But before
properly introducing the approach, I have to say a few words about my use of constructionism
throughout this essay. I will use the term in a rather loose sense, coupling together all lines of thought
invested in explicating the ‘social construction’ of any subject. This includes approaches that label
themselves as ‘constructivism’ instead of ‘constructionism’, and even approaches which talk about
the ‘cultural construction of’ any subject instead of talking about a speciﬁcally ‘social’ construction.
In fact, I will use the term in the loosest sense, that is, the sense in which practically anyone’s depart-
mental colleagues talk about the social construction of this and that during coﬀee breaks. This means
that most of the time, unless I qualify, anyone is free to understand constructionism by whatever they
see ﬁt in such situations.
It is this common academic sense of constructionism that I will measure against the modern Wes-
tern sense of the historicity of all things. I will have my point of departure in the following puzzlement:
at the same time when constructionism conquered the humanities and the social sciences by claiming
that its subjects of investigation are constructions of certain historical environments, the discipline of
history as the scholarly guardian of historicity experienced a crisis. While constructionist theories and
their appeal to historicity spread across disciplines, historians felt that their practice is being under-
mined by various brands of theories. This, I believe, is a truly perplexing situation. It poses the follow-
ing question: how was it possible that a sense of historicity simultaneously appeared vigorous in the
shape of constructionism and utterly wrecked in the shape of the practice of historical studies?
After setting the stage thereby, I will outline an answer by arguing that the crisis of history was due
to the fact that constructionism harboured an alternative sense of historicity, that is, an alternative
conception of historical change. Whereas historical studies, since their modern professionalization,
have been relying on the idea of historicism in conﬁguring change over time in developmental terms,
constructionism oﬀered a completely diﬀerent scenario I call unprecedented change. Contrasting
these competing ideas of historical change enables me then to consider the respective historicities
underlying the idea of historicism and the idea of constructionism as rival practices of temporal com-
parison. Inasmuch as both oﬀer scenarios of change over time, they necessarily invoke a comparison
between past and present conditions of the subjects they study. The temporal comparison carried out
by historicism considers the past condition of a certain subject as an earlier, underdeveloped version
of the more developed present condition of the very same subject. Contrary to this, constructionism
reveals the temporal incommensurability of present subjects of investigation to any preceding states
of aﬀairs, thereby implying that present subjects are not merely new versions of old subjects but truly
novel and relatively recent inventions. To see what all this means exactly, let me return to the ﬁrst
step and elaborate on the initial conundrum.
2See, respectively, Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); Richard Grusin, ed., The Nonhuman Turn (Minnea-
polis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Diana Coole and Samantha Frost eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2004).
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2. Tendencies of existential anxiety
There is something deeply bewildering and confounding about the postwar career of history. And the
bewilderment is not conﬁned to historical studies. It concerns the modern historical sensibility of
Western societies at its most general, that is, it concerns a speciﬁcally ‘historical’ way of making
sense of ourselves and the world as changing over time. Professionalized and institutionalized his-
torical studies is of course part of this larger picture as one particular practice among many others.
In fact, the source of the bewilderment is precisely a discrepancy between the ways in which his-
torical studies and certain other practices have been engaged in historical sense-making in the second
half of the last century. One of the most puzzling phenomena of the postwar scholarly and intellec-
tual scene was that a large part of historical studies somehow missed the ‘event’ when other disci-
plines within the humanities and social sciences ‘went historical’. By ‘going historical’ I mean the
introduction of the ‘historical’ dimension to various disciplines in the guise of social constructionism
with the aim of deconstructing long-standing standards of essentialism, determinism, and univers-
alism of the Western scholarly enterprise. Historical studies missed this ‘event’ in the sense that pro-
fessional historians simply had diﬀerent preoccupations at that time. They focused on another
‘event’, one that they conceived of as a multifarious theoretical attack targeting the core of the foun-
dations of their profession. The ‘event’ historians perceived was simply the sheer opposite than other
disciplines did: not the sudden emergence of an overwhelming historical sensibility but the threat of
its nonetheless sudden decay.
Both perceived ‘events’ generated larger tendencies of existential anxiety spreading over, respect-
ively, the wider scholarly world and the narrower world of professional historiography. These ten-
dencies pointed towards seemingly opposite ends and seemingly irreconcilable directions, with
historical sensibility playing a crucial but controversial role in both. In the shape of social construc-
tionism, historical sensibility appeared in the role of the principal cause of all the supposed intellec-
tual damage done in the past decades by pulling the ground oﬀ of all former certainties that could
withstand time by remaining unchanged. Yet, in the shape of historical studies, such a historical sen-
sibility seemed to play the role of the victim and was itself supposed to suﬀer all the damage under a
theoretical attack.
The latter tendency is the so-called crisis of history, meaning the crisis of the discipline. Of course,
it looks ‘so-called’ only in hindsight, and it looks ‘so-called’ only now that fewer historians are
inclined to feel threatened by theories. But between the 1960s and 1990s, a large part of the pro-
fession (just like, to be fair, many practitioners of other disciplines in the humanities and social
sciences) sensed danger in the basic insights of various brands of theories. Whereas some historians
feared the many kinds of poststructuralisms, others felt threatened by deconstruction, reader-
oriented literary theory, the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge, feminism, psychoanalysis, philosophy
of science, and philosophy of language. Although the whole cluster of theories were oftentimes refer-
enced as the ‘linguistic turn’,3 the threatening aspect for the practice of history was not simply a
theoretical focus on language but the pervasiveness of linguistic constructionism in theorizing the
relationship between language and the world in general (between the historian’s language and the
past in particular).
In this respect, the most reasonable concerns perhaps emerged from an encounter with the
insights of narrativist philosophy of history and narrative constructionism. In its most clearly articu-
lated form, narrativism appeared in the work of Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit,4 but in several
diverging versions it got fused and mixed in all possible combinations with the various theoretical
3For a detailed account on the ‘linguistic turn’ in history see Elizabeth A. Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
4Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1973); Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Hayden
White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987);
Frank R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 1983); Frank
R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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approaches mentioned above.5 All these theories seriously questioned the nature of historical knowl-
edge and what they assumed to be the majority view of the profession on questions of objectivity and
truth. They claimed that knowledge is constituted by historians who study past conditions and states
of aﬀairs, and that there is no way to measure this knowledge against past conditions and states of
aﬀairs themselves, independent of the mental and linguistic representations of historians. Within
their respective scopes, these theories argued that historical writing betrays an outdated epistemo-
logical position and thus an outdated conception of the relationship between language and past rea-
lity,6 that it falls within the genre of literary writing,7 that it exercises an un-reﬂexive stance,8 that it
maintains the masculine standards of the profession created at the time of the institutionalization of
the discipline,9 or that the institutionalized discipline exhibits a colonial ﬁxation and unavoidably
retains ‘Europe’ as the master subject of all particular histories.10
Although the above claims could have stirred disciplinary emotions even as taken separately, they
appeared even more powerful seen together. As a result, such criticism led to a general sense among
historians that a wholesale theoretical attack was launched on basically the entire historical enterprise
in the second half of the last century. The perception of suﬀering a wholesale attack gave way to a
growing anxiety about the discipline of history and about the historical sensibility informing it. In the
self-perception of historians, history as a discipline was challenged at best and even killed at worst, it
had to be defended, and the truth about it had to be told (just to refer to four well-known titles of the
recent past).11
As usual, the response to the challenge, the defense and the ‘truth’ about history came with con-
siderable delay. By the time the engagement of historians with theories hit the mainstream in the
1990s, the theoretical ﬁeld itself – the ﬁeld that is best called the theory and philosophy of history
– began to move to newer interests. By the early 2000s, postmodernist historical theory had already
earned the adjective ‘classic’. In a review of Keith Jenkins’s Reﬁguring History, Michael Roth suc-
cinctly summarized the situation as follows: ‘the theory wars are over. Jenkins’s Rethinking History
is Routledge classic, Hayden White is required reading, and subalterns speak from tenured pos-
itions’.12 Today, when it comes to theories that retain the scope of examining historical studies,
we witness a return to epistemological questions, even the aim of reviving analytical philosophy
of history, or eﬀorts aiming at postnarrativism within the analytical framework.13 A large body of
newer theories, however, broaden their scope and no longer conceive of themselves as second-
order knowledge on the knowledge production of the ﬁrst-order discipline of academic history. In
this respect, among many other new developments that this essay does not wish to recount, the
themes of historical time and temporality have become especially prominent lately,14 while
5For a fair overview of all these and (even more) theoretical approaches related to history see Nancy Partner and Sarah Foot, eds.,
The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory (London: Sage, 2013).
6See especially the classics of what may be called British postmodern historical theory. Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking History (London:
Routledge, 1991); Alun Munslow, Deconstructing History (London: Routledge, 1997).
7Alongside the earlier White references, see Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative Histories of the
French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); or, far later than the heyday of relevant debates, see Alun Mun-
slow, Narrative and History (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007).
8Robert F. Berkhofer, Beyond the Great Story: History and Text and Discourse (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1995),
esp. 243–83.
9Bonnie G. Smith, The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).
10Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Postcoloniality and the Artiﬁce of History: Who Speaks for “Indian” Pasts?’ Representations 37 (1992): 1–26.
11Ernst Breisach, On the Future of History: The Postmodernist Challenge and its Aftermath (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 2003);
Keith Windshuttle, The Killing of History: How a Discipline is Being Murdered By Literary Critics and Social Theorists (Sidney: Mcleay
Press, 1994); Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta, 1997); Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling
the Truth about History (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994).
12Michael S. Roth, ‘Classic Postmodernism’, History and Theory 43, no. 3 (2004): 378. For the reviewed book see Keith Jenkins,
Reﬁguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline (London: Routledge, 2003).
13Krzysztof Brzechczyn, ed., Towards a Revival of Analytical Philosophy of History: Around Paul A. Roth’s Vision of Historical Sciences
(Leiden: Brill, 2018); Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).
14Chris Lorenz and Berber Bevernage, eds., Breaking up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past and Future (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013); Helge Jordheim, ‘Introduction: Multiple Times and the Work of Synchronization’, History and
Theory 53, no. 4 (2014): 498–518; Victoria Fareld, ‘(In) Between the Living and the Dead: New Perspectives on Time in History’,
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metadisciplinary or transdisciplinary questions raised by the Anthropocene, posthumanism and
posthumanity signal completely new theoretical endeavours.15
Yet the fact that the theoretical ﬁeld is changing and the fact that debates with historians about
past theoretical concerns are themselves in the past, does not diminish the signiﬁcance of a once-felt
crisis within professional historical studies. This once-felt crisis, however, is only one side of the coin.
The other side is a simultaneous tendency of existential anxiety: the campaign of constructionism. In
the last half-century, everything – and literally everything – became a construction: social, cultural,
linguistic. The best illustration of how common constructionism-talk had become by the end of the
last century may be a remark of the pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty from the end of the 1990s.
In his Philosophy and Social Hope, Rorty ironically notes that ‘there is not, in fact, much naïvety left
these days. Tell a sophomore at an American college that something is only a social construct, and
she is likely to reply, “Yeah, I know. So are you, Mac”’.16
Social constructionism quickly conquered academia, fused and mixed with all the various afore-
mentioned brands of theories that historians also encountered in their own seemingly disciplinary-
speciﬁc crisis. As it turned out that practically all subjects to which scholars sacriﬁced their whole
lives previously were just another construction, existential anxiety spread over the entire scholarly
world, dividing it rather sharply and deeply. Those resisting to adhere, typically associated construc-
tionism with epistemic relativism and considered it a threat to the possibility of knowledge.17 At the
same time, advocates had to make clear that describing something as constructed does not mean that
it is ‘mere construction’ and does not entail the view that whatever is constructed is also not real.18
Besides, it is also important to point out the diversity of constructionist claims. For, as André Kukla
warns,
people who call themselves constructivists sometimes argue for a metaphysical thesis about some or all facts
about the world we live in, sometimes for an epistemological thesis concerning what can be known about
the world, and sometimes for a semantic thesis concerning what can be said about the world.19
Yet, regardless of what one meant by ‘construction’, the ‘constructionist’ label rapidly attained heavy
evaluative connotations and created tribal senses of academic belongings. Hacking emphatically
reports on this phenomenon by claiming that ‘the phrase has become a code. If you use if favorably,
you deem yourself rather radical. If you trash the phrase, you declare that you are rational, reason-
able, and respectable’.20
Now, despite the spectacular career of constructionism, there is something rather odd in the
second tendency of existential anxiety it sparkled. The oddity derives from the fact that the entire
constructionist-talk was based upon something which itself seemed to suﬀer from existential anxiety:
historical sensibility. For constructionism was and is still based on an irrepressible sense of histori-
city. Constructionist thought, of course, has various tenets and features, but at the core of construc-
tionism lies an appeal to history. Even if one hesitates to give deﬁnitions of the subjects of their study
– as practically every academic book does lately by claiming that nothing is ﬁxed and stable – there
are at least some ‘key assumptions’ that can be identiﬁed. According to Vivien Burr, it is such a ‘key
History Compass 14, no. 9 (2016), 430–40; Marek Tamm and Laurent Olivier, eds., Rethinking Historical Time: New Approaches to
Presentism (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).
15Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’, Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 197–222; Julia Adeney Thomas, ‘History
and Biology in the Anthropocene: Problems of Scale, Problems of Value’, American Historical Review 119, no. 5 (2014): 1587–607;
Libby Robin, ‘Histories for Changing Times: Entering the Anthropocene?’ Australian Historical Studies 44, no. 3 (2013): 329–40; Ewa
Domanska, ‘Posthumanist History’, in Debating New Approaches to History, ed. Marek Tamm and Peter Burke (London: Blooms-
bury, 2018), 327–38; Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, ‘Two Cultures of the Posthuman Future’, History and Theory 58, no. 2 (2019): 171–84.
16Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin, 1999), 217.
17See, for instance, Paul A. Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).
18Cf. the autobiographical story of Latour about the adventures and rejected associations concerning the early use of ‘constructi-
vism’ as self-description. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-network-theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 88–93.
19André Kukla, Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science (London: Routledge, 2000), 4 (emphasis in the original).
20Hacking, The Social Construction of What? vii.
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assumption’ of social constructionism that ‘the ways in which we commonly understand the world,
the categories and concepts we use, are historically and culturally speciﬁc’.21
But the historicity informing constructionist thought is not merely about the temporal and spatial
speciﬁcity of all things. Pointing at the ‘historical’ character of that which is considered to be socially
constructed is intended to eliminate long-standing ideas about a certain type of changelessness. In
Burr’s ﬁeld of study, psychology, this means the idea of ‘human nature’,22 while at the most general
level it refers to the idea of all and anything having a ‘nature’ or ‘essence’. Hacking’s analysis of social
constructionist thought, or, more speciﬁcally, what Hacking calls the grades of constructionist com-
mitment, even more wonderfully attests to this point. According to Hacking, ‘the historical’ is ‘the
least demanding grade of constructionism’,23 which does not mean that this is the weakest link that
one could just safely remove and constructionism would stand still. Quite the contrary. It means that
the historical grade provides the basis upon which all other grades of constructionist commitment
are built (ironic, reformist, unmasking, rebellious, and revolutionary are the ones Hacking men-
tions). With the help of the historical grade, one can make the aforementioned fundamental
claim that something is not inevitable, that it has no ‘nature’.24 All other grades are for additional
claims about whether that which is socially constructed qualiﬁes as a bad thing, and thus we should
or should not get rid of it.25 What one can claim without the additional claims, what one can claim by
relying only on the historical grade is something seemingly more modest. It goes as follows: there is
no such thing as the ‘nature’ of things, there is only their history.
3. Historicism vs. constructionism
The simultaneity of these seemingly contradictory tendencies qualiﬁes as a scholarly mystery begging
for explanation. On the one hand, there is history, the discipline, being devastated under a theoretical
attack; on the other, there is history, as a wider historical sensibility or sense of historicity, on its vic-
tory march to devastate everything else in the guise of constructionism. How could this be? How
could history – in the overall sense in which the discipline is an instance of historical sensibility –
appear both terribly helpless and extremely powerful at the same time?
The most obvious answer springing to mind somewhat automatically goes like this: if practically
everything is thought to be a social construction, then the discipline of history and the wider histori-
cal sensibility it relies on must be too. There is no apparent contradiction at all in supposing that the
modern historical sensibility, disguised in its latest form as social constructionism, turned against its
academic stronghold, the discipline of history. This explanation – according to which the modern
historical sensibility eventually reveals its own contingency – is based on the assumption that the
historicity of constructionist thought and professionalized historical studies as we know it may
essentially be identical. Even Hacking implies identity when asking: ‘how does historical “social” con-
structionism diﬀer from history? Not much, a matter of attitude, perhaps’.26
Is this explanation plausible? Well, not really. For if the case was so, if constructionism was just
like history as we know it, then historians likely would not have fancied a crisis of their discipline in
the ﬁrst place upon encountering such constructionist ideas (as they did). If history turned against
itself, then it could be reasonably expected that historians would have had a clue about what was
happening when encountering the very same historical sensibility that otherwise they themselves
practice, nurse, and guard (but they had not). Besides, if constructionism was the same as history
as we know it, then all those who eagerly turned to social constructionism because of its sense of
historicity could have just turned to the discipline of history instead (which they did not).
21Vivien Burr, Social Constructionism (London: Routledge, 2015), 4.
22Ibid., 4.
23Hacking, The Social Construction of What? 19.
24Ibid., 6–7.
25Ibid., 20–21.
26Ibid., 19.
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A feasible explanation of the situation, I think, must avoid the assumption that the historicity
informing historical studies and constructionism are somehow identical. It seems much more plaus-
ible to assume that there are two distinct ideas of history at play here, which is precisely the claim that
I wish to advance, namely, that the bitter and confusing situation described above is best understood
as the rivalry of two distinct ideas of history. The ideas in question are the idea of historicism and the
idea of constructionism, and the sense in which they are rivals is that they oﬀer alternative scenarios
for historical change, that is, alternative ways to conceive ourselves and the world as changing over
time ‘historically’.
To begin with the former, the idea of historicism is the deﬁning idea of history behind nineteenth
century German Historicism, under whose aegis history as an academic discipline has become insti-
tutionalized. In the succinct rendering of Frank Ankersmit from the middle of the 1990s, this
deﬁning idea of historicism is that ‘the nature of a thing lies in its history’.27 Ankersmit, however,
only captures the essence of Maurice Mandelbaum’s deﬁnition from two and a half decades earlier.
Mandelbaum’s deﬁnition, with which Ankersmit fully agrees, goes as follows: historicism is
the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of any phenomenon and an adequate assessment of its
value are to be gained through considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the role it played within a
process of development.28
Some forty years after Mandelbaum, this deﬁnition still stands. Frederick Beiser echoes it by claiming
that historicism is the view which holds that ‘the essence, identity or nature of everything in the
human world is made by history, so that it is entirely the product of the particular historical processes
that brought it into being’.29
Once again, the deﬁning idea of historicism claims that the nature of a thing lies in its history. In
parallel and also contrary to this, remember the constructionist claim: there is no such thing as the
‘nature’ of things, there is only their history. The two claims look deceptively alike. No wonder that
Hacking thinks that constructionism entails an appeal to the same old history. Yet there is, I think, a
crucial diﬀerence between the two, which eventually boils down to the question of how change is
conceived of. The diﬀerence between the two claims rather obviously revolves around the question
of the ‘nature’ of a thing. In the case of historicism, the ‘nature’ of something is what can be revealed
by studying how it has developed over time. Historicism does not do away the idea of things having a
‘nature’ but makes that ‘nature’ malleable in the course of unfolding. In the case of constructionism,
however, the concept of the ‘nature’ of anything whatsoever is the thing itself that becomes suspi-
cious. In other words, constructionism is skeptical about the idea that what goes through change
over time is a self-identical ‘nature’ of a subject identiﬁable in all its stages of development, and
that the existence of this subject can be traced back to its underdeveloped past. These diﬀerent atti-
tudes toward the nature of things imply diﬀerent conceptions of what an appeal to history may be.
For it is only insofar as historicism assumes a ‘nature’ of a thing that the history of that thing can take
the shape of a developmental process. Without the assumption of the ‘nature’ of a thing, the con-
structionist appeal to history is supposed to prove the point that the presently investigated subject
might not have existed in the past at all in any underdeveloped shape whatsoever.
As an example, consider what one could learn about democracy by invoking the respective senses
of historicity. In the ﬁrst case, by relying on the Historicist idea, knowing something about democ-
racy in the here and now means an examination of the history of democracy, which is supposed to
reveal what democracy is today in terms of what it has become so far, and – in light of its trajectory
leading to the present moment – where this becoming may continue to lead in the future. In the
second case, however, by relying on the constructionist idea, turning to the past will not reveal any-
thing about what democracy is today. What it will reveal is only what democracy was at certain time
27See Frank R. Ankersmit, ‘Historicism: An Attempt at Synthesis’, History and Theory 34, no. 3 (1995): 144.
28Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man & Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-century Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1971), 42.
29Frederick C. Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2 (emphasis in the original).
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periods, at certain moments over a non-continuous temporal plane, without a ‘nature’ of democracy
binding together those moments in a deep historical trajectory. It will reveal that at other time
periods (notwithstanding the existence of the word ‘democracy’ – like in ancient Greece) there
was no such thing as democracy at all because what we think we know as democracy today was
just invented at a more recent time. It will try to testify that democracy today is not an improvement
on Ancient Greek ideals but something completely other, and notwithstanding the retained name,
there is no identity-connection between the two. Furthermore, it will suggest that democracy, at
any given time, is what people make out of it, that it is not something we could know in the here
and now, but something we are free to make out of it, regardless of what the word itself meant
for previous eras.
At the most general level of identity association and dissociation, the same happens when sub-
stituting ‘democracy’ for ‘us’, ‘human beings’, or ‘human behavior’. The same happens when one
wants to answer the identity question, trying to ﬁnd out who ‘we’ are today. In the ﬁrst case, by
relying on the historicist idea, history appears to be a means of identity formation. It appears to be
a means by which we try to understand and shape who ‘we’ are today by exploring how we got
here and who we are now in terms of who we cannot escape to be in light of developing out of past
states of aﬀairs. Such historical sensibility clearly presupposes that we, in the here and now, are
strongly associated and aﬃliated with the past, notwithstanding all changes. Contrary to this,
the concept of history invoked in the constructionist claim denies such an association. What it
oﬀers instead and what explains its extraordinary appeal concerning the word of human aﬀairs
is the prospect of liberation. For that which is made sense of in terms of being invented as a
socio-cultural artefact might just as well vanish; and if the case is so, then, in fact, it can even
be facilitated to vanish.
As an example of liberating eﬀects, consider Hacking’s discussion of motherhood, according to
which
mothers who accept current canons of emotion and behavior may learn that the ways they are supposed to feel
and act are not ordained by human nature or the biology of reproduction. They need not feel quite as guilty as
they are supposed to, if they do not obey either old rules of family or whatever is the oﬃcial psycho-pediatric
rule of the day.30
Or, as a more politically explicit constructionist agenda with respect to liberation, consider Sally
Haslanger’s aim to ‘provide accounts of race and gender that clarify the sites and forms of construc-
tion involved, and that can also be fruitfully employed in the quest for social justice’.31 All in all, con-
trary to the contention of historicism that turning to the past reveals how present identities came to
be and instructs towards what we are about to be, the ultimate contention of constructionism is that
whatever we might be, there is nothing that we cannot escape to be.
4. Two ideas of historical change
Although the diﬀerence between the claims of historicism and constructionism may not appear to be
momentous at ﬁrst blush, the above discussion already indicates a sharp contrast. And this contrast
becomes even sharper when asking the question of how – as based on their respective assumptions
about the nature of things (or the lack thereof) – historicism and constructionism part ways in
accounting for change over time.
More emphatically phrased, I wish to argue that historicism and constructionism harbour conﬂ-
icting conceptions of historical change. Historicism, as its aforementioned deﬁnitions already indi-
cate, conﬁgures historical change by sketching a developmental process within which change in the
condition of an otherwise self-identical subject takes place. In Mandelbaum’s analysis, such a devel-
opmental view means ‘processes in which there was an unfolding of that which was already at least
30Cf. Hacking, The Social Construction of What? 2.
31Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6.
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implicitly present’.32 Constructionism oﬀers an alternative to this scenario by conceiving of historical
change in terms of what I call ‘unprecedented change’.33 The notion intends to capture a kind of
perceived societal change, which, instead of referring to a change in the condition of a subject,
means the displacement of the subject itself and its replacement with a newly constituted subject,
completely other than the one displaced. Unprecedented change is about the sudden coming-to-
existence of previously inexistent subjects in an event-like manner instead of unfolding from past
states of aﬀairs. It also entails the nonetheless event-like disappearance of subjects which appear,
expected to appear, or had appeared the same way. Such unprecedented change is most apparent
in today’s visions of the future concerning ecological and technological-scientiﬁc changes, both in
the shape of human-induced existential threats to humanity (as the worst prospect of a climate apoc-
alypse or a technological singularity) and in the shape of a promise of posthumanity and the promise
of a posthuman subject (a promise which, of course, comes out again as a threat to others).34
Constructionism, I believe, complements these future prospects by exercising a retrospective
stance and conﬁguring the relation to the past along such unprecedented changes. In times when
technological prospects promise to bring about a posthuman subject – dissociated and disconnected
from the human subject of the present – constructionism shows how the past can already be seen as
disconnected for present subjects. Attempting to picture present subjects as relatively recent inven-
tions without prior existence is what Joan Scott advocates as poststructuralist kinds of history writing
as critique. In fact, in Scott’s approach ‘critique’ appears as a synonym for ‘constructionism’, or at
least the deﬁnition Scott borrows from Barbara Johnson could just as well be the deﬁnition of a con-
structionist approach:
critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal in order to show that
these things have their history […] and that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) construct,
usually blind to itself.35
Critique as a constructionist approach implies for Scott an understanding of history that conﬁgures
change along discontinuous breaks instead of developmental processes. True enough, Scott expresses
herself in a vocabulary of discontinuity instead of disconnection, which is a term I would prefer to
indicate the underlying historicity of constructionism. But my claim is not that constructionist his-
torical practices deliberately conﬁgure change over time in terms of disconnective unprecedented
changes. What I advocate is to understand constructionism as such an idea of historical change,
regardless of the self-description of constructionist theories. Besides, even if in her own vocabulary,
Scott already has one the most reﬂexive constructivist agendas in declaring that ‘discontinuity, not
continuity or linear development’ is the ‘operative principle of history’, meaning that ‘the present is
understood to have resulted from its break with the past’ and ‘historical investigation locates the
breaks, describes them as the deviations they are from established norms, and attempts to account
for their emergence – not in terms of general principles of development, but in terms of the speciﬁ-
city of their occurrence’.36
There can hardly be a more explicit way to indicate that constructionism harbours an alternative
sense of historicity. Except, of course, when one ventures into theorizing such a view of history with
the intention to displace the modern idea of historical change as inherited from historicism. The
most powerful instance of such an intention is the approach from which Scott draws inspiration:
32Mandelbaum, History, Man & Reason, 44.
33See, most recently, Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, History in Times of Unprecedented Change: A Theory for the 21st Century (London:
Bloomsbury, 2019).
34See Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, ‘(The Impossibility of) Acting Upon a Story That We Can Believe’, Rethinking History 22, no. 1 (2018):
105–25; and Simon, ‘Two Cultures of the Posthuman Future’.
35Joan W. Scott, ‘History-writing as Critique’, in Manifestos for History, ed. Keith Jenkins, Sue Morgan, and Alun Munslow (London:
Routledge, 2007), 23. For Johnson’s quoted words see Barbara Johnson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Jacques Derrida, Dissemina-
tion, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), xv.
36Joan W. Scott, ‘After History?’ in Schools of Thought: Twenty-ﬁve Years of Interpretive Social Science, ed. Joan W. Scott and Debra
Keates (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 95.
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that of Michel Foucault’s. In a version inseparable from questions of domination and power, Fou-
cault tried to achieve something akin to the above description of unprecedented change by concep-
tualizing ‘genealogy’ as a novel sense of historicity. Against the historicist conﬁguration of change,
Foucault maintained that ‘nothing in man – not even his body – is suﬃciently stable to serve as
the basis for self-recognition’; that ‘the traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view
of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically
dismantled’; and that his alternative view ‘introduces discontinuity into our very being’.37
In practice, however, even before his explicitly framed genealogical approach, Foucault already
attempted to carry out such a break with the historicist account for change over time in his 1966
book The Order of Things, branded as archaeology. Without diving into the internal debates of Fou-
cault scholarship about how the later genealogical approach relates to the earlier archaeological, what
I wish to point out is only that Foucault’s analysis of the invention of the human as the object of
knowledge of the newly emerging human sciences in the nineteenth century is the best example
of conceiving of the past in terms of unprecedented changes. In one rather over-complicated sen-
tence of Foucault, the invention of the human (and the human sciences which study the human)
took place as follows:
The epistemological ﬁeld traversed by the human sciences was not laid down in advance: no philosophy, no
political or moral option, no empirical science of any kind, no observation of the human body, no analysis
of sensation, imagination, or the passions, had ever encountered, in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, any-
thing like man; for man did not exist (any more than life, or language, or labour); and the human sciences did
not appear when, as a result of some pressing rationalism, some unresolved scientiﬁc problem, some practical
concern, it was decided to include man (willy-nilly, and with a greater or lesser degree of success) among the
objects of science – among which it has perhaps not been proved even yet that it is absolutely possible to class
him; they appeared when man constituted himself in Western culture as both that which must be conceived of
and that which is to be known.38
But the constitution of the human (which Foucault consistently calls ‘man’) is only half of the story.
The other half is the logical entailment accompanying any approach based on the non-inevitability of
that which is constructed at a certain time in a certain cultural environment: the potential disappear-
ance of the very construction in question. Accordingly, Foucault does not hesitate to predict the dis-
appearance of the human as an object of knowledge as soon as the arrangements of knowledge that
enabled its emergence disappear. Hence the iconic closing paragraph of The Order of Things:
If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no
more than sense the possibility – without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises – were to
cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one
can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.39
As the discipline of history is one of the human sciences that came to exist to study the novel inven-
tion of the human in Foucault’s account,40 the above claim implies that one day it has to share the
fate of disappearing together with the human as its object of knowledge. More speciﬁcally, if the
conceptual shape in which history as the professionalized and institutionalized ﬁeld of study
emerged to study the human as changing over time is historicism, then Foucault’s view implies
its disappearance too.
As of today, however, this is not yet the case. The historicist idea of historical change seems to
coexist with the constructionist one, instead of disappearing completely. Although its paradigmatic
endeavours, such as classical philosophies of history or massive volumes of histories of nations which
stretch back national stories to the deep past, are thoroughly discredited today, the developmental
37Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 87–
8. What applies to Scott’s use of discontinuity applies to Foucault too: I interpret it as an eﬀort to express a disconnection from
past states of aﬀairs, even if it is phrased in another vocabulary.
38Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 2002), 375–6.
39Ibid., 422.
40Ibid., 400–7.
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conﬁguration of change over time survives in many historiographical practices. As of today, it
remains an eﬀective, useful, and important conceptual tool of societal self-understanding.
Every historiographical piece that intends to understand the present by answering the question of
‘How did we get here?’ is destined to tell a story in terms of development, process, and an unfolding
course of events. The story can, of course, be sophisticated in being multilayered, multicausal, and
even multitemporal in being attentive to the diﬀerent pace of changes in diﬀerent domains. But pre-
senting the past as leading up to the present (and presenting it as being constitutive of the present
condition) necessarily takes the shape of a story of unfolding processes. Again, such stories are not
necessarily stories of successful fulﬁlments that play out along a straight linear temporality, but they
are necessarily stories of deep continuity over time.
As a concrete example consider Dan Stone’s Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe Since
1945.41 In short, Stone’s book recounts the rise and fall of ‘postwar consensus’ in two senses: in
socio-economic terms and in terms of a broad antifascism on the ideological level. Although the con-
sensus in the ﬁrst sense results in two storylines with respect to the East and the West, the antifascist
consensus represents a common ground. Whereas the rise of such consensus gave way to typically
positively evaluated developments in Europe, its fall led to the more recent emergence of what Stone
calls, alongside many political commentators and pundits lately, ‘right-wing populism’. The book is,
of course, more complex in its larger imperatives (such as the study of the memory of the Second
World War in order to grasp the present), in its treatment of socio-economic explanatory factors,
and so forth. But its overall story arch perfectly exempliﬁes the point I wish to make concerning
the survival of the historicist ideas of historical change and its retained instrumentality in societal
self-understanding. And, needless to say, the persistence of the historicist idea is not conﬁned to indi-
vidual history books. Among other forms, it persists in popular histories of humanity,42 in the
approach of big history which encompass the entire story of the universe,43 and, as recent criticism
points out, even in a large variety of global histories.44
5. Rival practices of temporal comparison
Connecting all this back to the initial conundrum of this essay, it seems to me that the perceived
threat to the existence of historiography in the decades between the 1960s and the 1990s was the
sudden appearance of an alternative way of conceiving of change over time in human aﬀairs. Regard-
less of whether most historians were aware of it or not, in those decades they were ﬁghting an alterna-
tive idea of historical change in the shape of constructionism. To gain a deeper understanding of
what such alternative ways of conceiving historical change might mean, in the remaining pages I
will interpret historicism and constructionism as rival practices of temporal comparison.
But what can the phrase ‘practices of comparison’ possibly mean? To begin with, studying prac-
tices of comparison does not mean venturing into the practice of comparative history as an approach
or method within the discipline of history.45 Historicism as a historical practice – and generally
speaking the conceptual shape of the discipline of history at its institutionalization under the
aegis of German Historicism – does not qualify as comparative history in such terms.46 Yet, the
41Dan Stone, Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
42Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (London: Harvill Secker, 2014).
43David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Cynthia Stokes Brown,
Big History: From the Big Bang to the Present (New York: The New Press, 2007).
44Franz L. Fillafer, ‘A World Connecting? From the Unity of History to Global History’, History and Theory, 56, no. 1 (2017): 3–37;
Helge Jordheim, ‘Synchronizing the World: Synchronism as Historiographical Practice, Then and Now’, History of the Present 7,
no. 1 (2017): 64–8.
45For various ways to engage in the academic practice of comparative history see Chris Lorenz, ‘Comparative Historiography: Pro-
blems and Perspectives’, History and Theory 38, no. 1 (1999): 25–39; Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Com-
parison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reﬂexivity’, History and Theory 45, no. 1 (2006): 30–50; Thomas Welskopp,
‘Vergleichende Geschichte’, Europäishe Geschichte Online (2010), http://ieg-ego.eu/de/threads/theorien-und-methoden/
vergleichende-geschichte.
46Welskopp, ‘Vergleichende Geschichte’, 1.
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discipline necessarily implies a speciﬁc comparative practice shared by all histories, regardless of
their particular methodological take and commitment to particular historiographical schools. His-
toricism, like anything we call ‘historical’ in modern times, implies a temporal comparison between
the changing states of aﬀairs over time: between past, present, and future states. That which we call
‘historical’ in the Western world since the late Enlightenment is simply that which we conceive of as
changing over time in human aﬀairs, while that which we call ‘ahistorical’ is that which we conceive
of as changeless. Comparative history is then a particular method within the discipline that at its
largest is a practice of comparison in terms of comparing time-separated items in a changing course
of aﬀairs.
The interpretation of historicism and constructionism as rival practices of temporal comparison
is aﬃliated with the endeavour of Angelika Epple and Walter Erhart, according to which Western
modernity kicked oﬀ various practices of comparing – from travel writing to the birth of comparative
sciences – which aimed at understanding the world by putting things into comparative relations with
each other.47 As Western modernity’s practices of seeking similarities and diﬀerences have been clo-
sely linked with the endeavour of measuring and unifying the world, they were hardly innocent. But
comparison in general –the epistemology of comparison in the ﬁrst place – is hardly innocent, of
course. And if studies of comparative practices agree on the fact that comparison in general is a heav-
ily political operation,48 the same must be true of its subcase: a speciﬁcally temporal way of putting
things of the world in relation to each other that we usually associate with history and historical
thinking. As Epple and Erhart note, temporal comparability came about in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century with the eﬀect of making Western modernity look attractive by describing temporal
relations in terms of backwardness and progressivity (among others).49 The establishment of such
temporal comparability is of course nothing other than the emergence of the historicist idea of his-
tory with its developmental scenario of change, that is, the idea of a historical trajectory within which
certain states of aﬀairs and certain subjects can appear as backwards and progressive as compared to
others. Yet the temporal aspect does not seem to play a prominent role in the approach of Epple and
Erhart, and their scope of investigating practices of comparison does not extend over more recent
phenomena. Hence my intention to contribute to and enrich the endeavour of mapping practices
of comparing with a focus on the temporal aspect and with respect to constructionism as a relatively
novel practice as measured against historicism.
The thesis I wish to put forward is that historicism and constructionism, as ideas of historical
change and as conceptual tools of academic practices, oﬀer alternative ways of comparing temporally
separated states of aﬀairs and conditions of subjects. Whereas historicism established the very com-
parability of changing states of aﬀairs and changing conditions over time in the condition of a self-
identical subject, constructionism held up the incommensurability of diﬀerent states of aﬀairs and
conditions in diﬀerent times, thereby questioning the temporal survival of the self-identical subject
as the common ground of temporal comparison. Seen this way, the otherwise deceptively similar his-
toricist and constructionist ideas concerning the nature of things (or the lack thereof) look strikingly
incompatible. It is no longer bewildering that historical studies as wardens of the historicist practice
of temporal comparison felt existentially threatened by an encounter with the constructionist advo-
cacy of temporal incommensurability.
To substantiate this claim, it makes sense to elaborate a bit on the notion of temporal incommen-
surability. First of all, note that I refer to incommensurability and not incomparability. Although the
47Angelika Epple and Walter Erhart, ‘Die Welt Beobachten – Praktiken des Vergleichens’, in Die Welt Beobachten: Praktiken des Ver-
gleichens, ed. Angelika Epple and Walter Erhart (Frankfurt: Campus, 2015), 7–31.
48See, for instance, R. Radhakrishnan, ‘Why Compare?’, New Literary History 40, no. 3 (2009): esp. 453–71; R. Radhakrishnan, Theory
in an Uneven World (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 72–81; Susan Stanford Friedman, ‘Why Not Compare?’, PMLA 126, no. 3 (2011):
753–62; Natalie Melas, All the Diﬀerence in the World: Postcoloniality and the Ends of Comparison (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2007); Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London: Verso, 1998).
49Epple and Erhart, ‘Die Welt Beobachten’, 12–3.
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two terms have much in common, they are not the same.50 I will return to the question of incom-
mensurability at a later stage and discuss it in a more detailed fashion. For now, what seems impor-
tant to point out is that whereas incommensurability literally means the absence of common
measures, incomparability refers to the impossibility of carrying out any sort of comparative oper-
ation whatsoever. Accordingly, incommensurability as the absence of measure does not mean the
absence of comparison and does not refute the overall possibility of comparison. But it certainly
refutes a particular practice of comparison: that which is based on the postulation of a common
measure supposedly intrinsic to all items compared.
Along these considerations, my claim is that what temporal incommensurability refutes thereby is
precisely the practice of historicist comparison. In order to make this and the previous claims intel-
ligible, the ﬁrst thing to do is to come to terms with the possibility of comparison in general and its
historicist practice in particular. As Johannes Grave points out in a practice theory approach to prac-
tices of comparison, the basic constitution of comparative acts may appear as ‘trivial’ in its ‘elemen-
tary form’:51 it consists of at least two but possibly more items put into comparative relation by
means of a third item, known in scholarly Latin as tertium comparationis. Yet the triviality of the
elementary form dissipates immediately with the introduction of the temporal aspect, that is, with
the introduction of historicity and change over time. The reason for this is that the tertium in tem-
poral comparison is one single self-identical subject which is considered to go through changes over
time. Whenever one writes a history of subject X, the tertium is the subject X itself, and the compared
items are diﬀerent conditions of subject X over time. The relation between the diﬀerent conditions of
subject X, inasmuch as the subject remains self-identical, inasmuch as it has a ‘nature’ as in histori-
cism, is a gradual developmental process, the unfolding of X. As an almost perfect example, consider
national histories of nineteenth-century Europe standing for subject X. In the words of Stefan Berger,
a national history narrative
might retrace a remote past of foreign domination to a period when the nation allegedly struggled against such
oppression and for independence. Ultimately this ﬁght was supposed to end in the creation of an independent
state with a modernizing society.52
As a practice of temporal comparison, this means that the history of a nation as a self-identical sub-
ject begins in an underdeveloped condition of the subject and ends in its developed condition point-
ing toward the full realization of a long assumed potential. In between the two diﬀerent temporal
conditions, the gradual developmental process – directed toward its destined fulﬁlment – plays
out in a scenario of change over time as the very becoming of the subject.
What this indicates is that the historicist practice of temporal comparison is not ‘merely’ a com-
parison. As its inherent feature, it entails a deﬁnite way that leads from one condition to another over
time. Being conﬁgured as a developmental process, the way that establishes a connection between the
diﬀerent conditions of the subject over time necessarily upholds value judgments between underde-
veloped, progressive, and fulﬁlled conditions.53 Although these entailed values are intrinsic to the
historicist practice of temporal comparison, the situation becomes even more complex and politically
50For discussions of the relationship between incommensurability and incomparability in value theory and in the philosophy of
science (the latter being the context within which the term emerged) see Ruth Chang, ed., Incommensurability, Incomparability,
and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Commensurability, Comparability, Com-
municability’, in The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview, ed. Thomas
S. Kuhn, James Conant, and John Haugeland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 33–57.
51Johannes Grave, ‘Vergleichen als Praxis: Vorüberlegungen zu einer praxistheoretisch orientierten Untersuchung von Vergleichen’,
in Die Welt Beobachten: Praktiken des Vergleichens, ed. Angelika Epple and Walter Erhart (Frankfurt: Campus, 2015), 136.
52Stefan Berger with Christoph Conrad, The Past as History: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave, 2015), 2.
53The most prominent historian of the modern Western notion of history, Reinhart Koselleck, is of course aware of the inherent
evaluative aspects of lived time as history. In discussing the dynamism and the movement of the course of human aﬀairs brought
about by the modern sense of historicity, Koselleck remarks on the conservative and progressive positions which, respectively,
intended to hold back and speed up the movement of the historical process. See Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Seman-
tics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 246.
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charged as soon as the subject – the tertium comparationis – gains a spatial dimension as well. As a
practice of both temporal and spatial comparison, historicism compares the diﬀerent temporal con-
ditions of any supposedly same and self-identical subject as it is assumed to be spread across diﬀerent
parts of the world and diﬀerent cultures.
This means that the scope of the historicist temporal comparison is necessarily global. But it does
not mean that histories written on this premise necessarily step out of their national frameworks in
practice. Nor does the global scope entail that such histories would qualify as global histories as
understood today in historiography. It means only that the historicist way of temporal comparison
implies a global appeal in spatial terms, a postulated global unity as an endpoint. The expected global
realization of the potential inherent in the ‘nature’ of things is the background assumption of the
practice of temporal comparison in historicism. Accordingly, when it investigates the ‘nature’ of
such subjects as their history, historicism compares items both temporally and spatially with refer-
ence to this shared ‘nature’ as the tertium that is considered to be intrinsic to all items compared.
It is not much of a surprise that the politics of such comparison gained the most attention lately in
postcolonial debates, having been challenged on the ground of its eurocentrism. To unpack the inter-
twinement of temporal and spatial comparison as the politics of the historicist practice of compari-
son through a question, let me recite the story with which R. Radhakrishnan opens his essay ‘Why
Compare?’ According to the story, whenever Radhakrishnan – living and working in the United
States – visits Chennai, India, he cannot but compare things of the world over the course of long
conversations with his rickshaw driver. They simply cannot escape discussing their respective experi-
ences in comparative terms, including traﬃc situations. When comparing the highly structured Uni-
ted States lane system to the absence of lanes and the arbitrariness of traﬃc in most of Chennai,
Radhakrishnan is even tempted to argue that the former is what ‘any sane human being would
choose’, despite the fact that he is able to see ‘the relative autonomy’ of the driver’s ‘rationale within
his Lebenswelt’.54 Given all this, Radhakrishnan asks: ‘is it possible to have that exchange without
having to invoke the temporality of historicism that mandates that the state of traﬃc in a ﬁrst-
world situation is necessarily superior to the traﬃc in an underdeveloped third-world context?’55
Although Radhakrishnan does not consider this possibility, I think that constructionism answers
his question at the most general level. It eliminates the possibility of interpreting a comparative situ-
ation in terms of backwardness and progressivity by claiming that diﬀerent states of aﬀairs and con-
ditions over time are incommensurable. Inasmuch as the respective traﬃc situations are not diﬀerent
temporal states and conditions of one single subject as a tertium, the seemingly chaotic Chennai
traﬃc is not reduced to be understood as one version of the United States lane system. Inasmuch
as a traﬃc situation is not a temporal version of the other, they simply cannot appear as the under-
developed and progressive counterparts of each other.
When constructionism claims that there is no such thing as the ‘nature’ of things, what it claims is
that there is no self-identical subject as a tertium comparationis that could serve as a common
measure intrinsic to all temporally dispersed and separated items of comparison. By embracing
such temporal incommensurability, constructionism implies that the entire historicist practice of
temporal comparison, including two centuries of scholarship as typically carried out by professional
historical studies, is based on a misguided assumption. Needless to say, this is a huge claim. Yet it
does not mean that this is an explicitly voiced claim of all constructionist approaches. I do not
wish to argue that constructionism deliberately challenged historicism and most of historical studies
by advocating a rival practice of temporal comparison based on the assumption of temporal incom-
mensurability. What I wish to argue for is an interpretation of constructionism as such a rival prac-
tice, despite the fact that to a large extent neither constructionists nor historicists were aware of the
fact of such rivalry (and despite the fact that they most certainly did not conceptualize their clash in
terms of being competing ideas of historical change and rival practices of temporal comparison).
54Radhakrishnan, ‘Why Compare?’, 453.
55Ibid., 458.
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The most obvious example of the constructionist practice of temporal comparison – carried out
on the assumption of temporal incommensurability – is the book that kick-started the scholarly
debate on the very term ‘incommensurability’: Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolu-
tions, ﬁrst published in 1962.56 The book argues that the history of science is characterized by rarely
occurring revolutionary events that Kuhn calls paradigm shifts. These shifts come between long
periods of normal science, during which scientists work within a shared framework of a scientiﬁc
theory as an established paradigm. On the Kuhnian account, it is such a new period of normal
science that is incommensurable with whatever was considered as normal science prior to the para-
digm shift.
The incommensurability thesis is central to understanding the extent to which The Structure of
Scientiﬁc Revolutions is an appeal to a sense of historicity. And this is no small extent. Already
the opening sentence of the book’s ﬁrst chapter – tellingly entitled as ‘Introduction: A Role for His-
tory’ – indicates the stakes by claiming that ‘history, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote
of chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which are now
possessed’.57 Incommensurability, as seen from the viewpoint of Kuhn’s appeal to history, is nothing
other than the conceptual instrument by which Kuhn attempted to achieve the intended transform-
ation and abandon the reigning image of science as a cumulative and developmental process.
Yet, I think that Kuhn’s appeal to a sense of historicity has led to one of the greatest misunder-
standings and confusions in the reception of The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions. Philosophers of
science, even today, tend to regard Kuhn as a cornerstone of initiating a historical turn or a historicist
kind of philosophy of science, resulting in the establishment of the integrated ﬁeld of study called
history and philosophy of science (HPS).58 Whereas the latter achievement may indeed be a new
institutional occurrence, the former reference to a historical turn is largely misleading inasmuch
as it mistakenly implies that the pre-Kuhn view of science was anything but historical. Is this a plaus-
ible claim? Was not already the reigning view of a cumulative scientiﬁc progress in Kuhn’s own time
‘historical’? Well, of course it was. The accumulation of knowledge over time, new theories building
upon and adding to older theories over the course of a historical process conceived of as progressing
onwards, is precisely the view of history as Western modernity invented it. The image of science as
unfolding over time in successive stages of development was historical exactly in the way that his-
torians have called ‘historicist’ throughout the modern period.59 Accordingly, what Kuhn challenged
by an appeal to history was not an ahistorical view of science, but the historicist view of science.
Despite the fact that maybe even Kuhn did not understand his own evocation of history, it challenged
the historicist idea of historical change and the historicist practice of temporal comparison as
56Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). As to putting the term into
wider circulation and initiating the discussion about it, Kuhn is co-credited in the company of Paul Feyerabend, whose essay
featuring the term came out in the very same year. See the essay reprinted as Paul Feyerabend, ‘Explanation, Reduction and
Empiricism’, in Realism, Rationalism and Scientiﬁc Method: Philosophical Papers, Vol I. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981), 44–96.
57Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions, 150.
58See, for instance, Alexander Bird, ‘Kuhn and the Historiography of Science’, in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions – 50 Years
On, ed. William J. Devlin and Alisa Bokulich (Dordrecht: Springer, 2015), 23–38; Thomas Nickles, ‘Philosophy of Science and His-
tory of Science’, Osiris 10, no. 1 (1995): 138–63; Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, ‘Historicism and the Failure of HPS’, Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science 55 (2016): 3–11. The question of how and why philosophers of science considered Kuhn as a ‘historicist’
itself would deserve an article-length treatment. What I can indicate here is only that the source of the confusion lies in equating
‘historicism’ and the adjective ‘historicist’ with the idea of change over time, instead of reserving the term ‘historicism’ for a cer-
tain type of change over time, namely, that which is processual and developmental. For philosophers of science, Kuhn’s sheer act
of sketching a pattern for change seems to constitute a ground ﬁrm enough to label him ‘historicist’. This, I believe, makes phi-
losophers of science inattentive to the most signiﬁcant innovation of Kuhn’s approach, which is not the fact that The Structure of
Scientiﬁc Revolutions accounts for change over time, but that it does so by sketching a type of change that is anything but ‘his-
toricist’ and in fact goes against two centuries of ‘historicist’ tradition.
59This has not much to do with what Karl Popper called ‘historicism’ as the eﬀort to sketch general laws of historical evolution
aiming at prediction, with which Anglo-American philosophers of science might have been more familiar at the time of the pub-
lication of Kuhn’s book. See Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge, 2002).
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 15
exercised on the subject called ‘science’ by means of introducing the incommensurability thesis as a
rival sense of historicity.
The above interpretation of Kuhn may signiﬁcantly depart from the most typical understandings
of incommensurability. Philosophers of science tend to interpret Kuhnian incommensurability as a
translation problem between the language of scientiﬁc theories.60 To say a few words in defense of
my interpretation, I would like to point to two key aspects in which the term clearly exceeds the
conﬁnes of being a mere translation problem in The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions: ﬁrst, incom-
mensurability has a much broader scope when it appears throughout the book as a matter of world-
views; and second, it has a temporal focus as it concerns time-separated items.
As to the question of scope, Kuhnian incommensurability as a matter of worldviews means that
‘the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in diﬀerent worlds’, so that they ‘see
diﬀerent things when they look from the same point in the same direction’.61 Besides, the entire tenth
chapter of the book is devoted to the topic of ‘Revolutions as Changes in World Views’.62 As to the
question of incommensurability being a matter of time-separated items, the ﬁrst thing to concede
that the case is not necessarily so, even according to Kuhn. The diﬀerent ‘worlds’ of paradigms
may occupy the same spatial and temporal environment. This is what happens at times when the
old paradigm is not yet abandoned and the new paradigm, although already conceived and advo-
cated, is not yet accepted, like in the metaphorical situation implied above, when proponents of
alternative paradigms look from the same point in the same direction. This, however, should not
prevent one from seeing that the central (and also the title) theme of The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revo-
lutions is the temporal succession of incommensurable paradigms in terms of new ones replacing and
superseding old ones. Incommensurable paradigms can compete at the same time, but what makes
such incommensurability ‘historical’ is precisely the invocation of the temporal dimension.63
Foucault’s The Order of Things – commonly considered as the most similar approach to Kuhn’s –
is another major example of a practice of temporal comparison based on the incommensurability of
time-separated items. As discussed earlier, Foucault makes the case for the constitution of the human
as an object of knowledge in modern thought and claims that ‘before the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, man did not exist’.64 In the period prior to the modern one, what Foucault calls the Classical
episteme, the human as the object of knowledge was simply unthinkable. It came to be conceivable
only with the emergence of a new episteme, and as soon as a new shift in the episteme occurs, as soon
as conditions of possibility change, it will vanish. Some crucial diﬀerences concerning conceptual
and methodological framings aside, shifts in the episteme imply similarly radical and incommensur-
able changes over time as Kuhn’s paradigm shifts. Foucault’s scope is much broader though. A scien-
tiﬁc paradigm, even when understood as a worldview, cannot match the breadth of a Foucauldian
episteme as a condition of possibility and historical a priori of knowledge regimes. In Foucault’s
case, temporal incommensurability is concerned with these very conditions that determine what
can be asserted or what can count as true at certain times. Or, as Hacking phrases in a comparison
of Foucault and Kuhn, incommensurability in Foucault concerns ‘systems of possibility’.65
60Of course, such debates take into account Kuhn’s later elaborations on the term. Those elaborations are, however, largely due to
the criticism which already set the agenda of considering incommensurability as mainly a translation problem. For an account on
the career of the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability see James A. Marcum, ‘The Evolving Notion and Role of Kuhn’s Incom-
mensurability Thesis’, in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions, 115–34. On the shifting position of the late Kuhn see Howard
Sankey, ‘Taxonomic Incommensurability’, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12, no. 1 (1998): 7–16.
61Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions, 150.
62Ibid., 111–35.
63In discussing scientiﬁc revolutions, Kuhn nevertheless refers to his main concern by the phrase ‘scientiﬁc development’. It occurs
twenty-nine times throughout the book, most likely signiﬁcantly contributing to Kuhn’s later description as ‘historicist’, as dis-
cussed in an earlier note. I would like to attribute Kuhn’s recourses to the notion of development (a central notion in a historicist
vocabulary) to the unavailability of a new overall vocabulary that could suﬃciently conceptualize an equally new sense of his-
toricity entailed by the replacement of incommensurable paradigms. At the same time, however, the notions of paradigm and
incommensurability themselves can be seen as conceptual eﬀorts to create such a vocabulary.
64Foucault, The Order of Things, 336.
65Ian Hacking, ‘Michel Foucault’s Immature Science’, in Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 97.
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The reason to return to Foucault and The Order of Things is that the role played by the notion of
episteme is crucial in understanding the question of comparability under the condition of incom-
mensurability in a constructionist approach. Even though constructionism holds up the incommen-
surability of time-separated items, it is nevertheless a practice of temporal comparison. And
Foucault’s episteme, it seems to me, plays here the role of a tertium in a comparative situation.
Not just any tertium though, but one that denies the existence of a common measure intrinsic to
the compared items. As a practice of comparison, constructionism still necessitates a measure as a
tertium, but this measure becomes external at least to one of the compared items. It invokes a
measure devised by the scholar as a conceptual tool that enables comparison in the absence of a
measure assumed to be common to all items compared.
In the case of Foucault, it can be reasonably pointed out that the episteme as a measure and con-
ceptual tool is the product of Foucault’s very episteme. It may very well be that a temporal compari-
son based on incommensurability, in its general outlook, is necessarily a product of the latest
temporal item. This, however, would disqualify the comparative practice of temporal incommensur-
ability as biased towards its own time only if not having a point of view at all was possible. It is among
necessarily biased practices that the constructionist practice of temporal comparison conveys a sense
of historicity with its own speciﬁc agenda: constructionism attempts to understand its own time by
showing how it is anything like whatever had been preceding it.
6. Historicizing the new
Hopefully it is clear by now that it is not my intention to argue that constructionism has the
potential to do away the politics of comparison. Avoiding the pitfalls of the politics of the histori-
cist practice of temporal comparison does not mean a refutation of political agendas entailed by
practices of comparing. Nor does this mean an overall refutation of any engagement in other com-
parative practices. Constructionism is simply another kind of temporal comparison with its own
entailments and agendas. Not to mention that if not comparing at all was possible, it would be a
position just as heavily loaded with questions of power and politics as is any practice of compar-
ing.66 It must be equally clear at this point that I do not wish to resolve any debate concerning the
issue of incommensurability either. The discussion in philosophy of science on the question of
whether scientiﬁc theories are incommensurable or not (and in what sense they are or are not
so) is not particularly relevant to the take-away message of this essay. What I wanted to point
out by touching upon such debates is only that there is a practice of temporal comparison
which happens to have a lot to do with upholding a sense of incommensurability, regardless of
the question of the philosophical plausibility of the term.
The moral of the story of the previous pages is something other. Arguing that Western societies
exhibit today two competing senses of historicity which entail two distinct ideas of historical change
and boil down to two incompatible practices of temporal comparison gains signiﬁcance when it
comes to the imperative of historicizing present-day phenomena. In the simplest terms, the message
of this essay is that we better know what we are doing when we appeal to history, for such an appeal
can evoke two incompatible operations that yield contradictory results. A seemingly unitary appeal
to history either shows today that whatever is perceived as new developed out of past conditions (so
that the present appears just as the past always have been), or it shows that whatever was in the past
has nothing to do with today’s perceived novelty (so that the present appears as unprecedented).
Whereas the former is the result of an appeal to a historicist sense of historicity, the latter derives
from an appeal to the constructionist one.
66In the view of Susan Stanford Friedman, ‘to refuse comparison is also a political act, one that can potentially reinstate the existing
hierarchies by not challenging them’. Friedman, ‘Why Not Compare?’, 755. Yet, given the fact that constructionism refuses only
temporal comparison, this certainly does not apply to constructionism. What is more, its refusal to temporally compare, as dis-
cussed earlier, stems from a desire to politically liberate by not tying subjects to notions of essence and inherent nature.
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Being aware of the contradictory operations that can be mobilized by a deceptively unique sense
of historicity is, I believe, of crucial importance in times when perceived novelty looms just about
everywhere.
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